Marquette Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 1 December 1937

Article 4

The Administration of Justice as Affected by
Insecurity of Tenure of Judicial and Administrative
Officers
Charles A. Riedl

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Charles A. Riedl, The Administration of Justice as Affected by Insecurity of Tenure of Judicial and Administrative Officers, 22 Marq. L. Rev.
38 (1937).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol22/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AS
AFFECTED BY INSECURITY OF TENURE OF JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS
CHARLES

A.

RIEDL

A

N extremely important part of the task of government is the
administration of justice. Everybody knows in a general way what
is meant by the term, administration of justice, but when we attempt
a precise definition, we find ourselves immediately in difficulty. The
problem which presents itself is to determine the relation between law
and the administration of justice. On this point there are two distinct
schools of thought. The one, to which the average layman subscribes,
is of the opinion that the administration of justice is synonomous with
the administration of the law. Its justice is always "according to law."
It conceives the judicial process as more or less mechanical, as an
application of existing laws to particular cases. Its quest is for what
Mr. Walter Lippman has called an "automatic governor"; its ideal,
"a government of law, not men."
Opposed to this school of thought is the opinion of an increasingly
large number of lawyers and judges who maintain that there is, and
should be, a large element of "judicial discretion" in the administration of justice. Such legal giants as Roscoe Pound, Justice Cardozo,
and the late Justice Holmes," insist on the importance of judge-made
law as a part of wise "social engineering." This pointing out of the
part played by the social, economic and philosophical background
of the judge in shaping judicial decisions is one of the main contributions of the sociological school of jurisprudence of which these men
are the chief exponents. Regardless of how we feel on the question it
is imperative that we adopt a realistic attitude toward the fact of the
existence of judge-made law.
Granting that the ideal for the governance of human society would
be a set of laws so perfect and complete that the judge need but decide
which statute to apply in order to effect substantial justice, we are
forced to admit that the existence of such a body of laws is an empty
hope, a thing "that never was on land or sea," nor will be. The impossibility of an ideal set of laws flows from the very nature of human
existence, in which the only constant thing is change. Law, in order to
' Cf. on this subject Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (1923) 36 HARV.
L. REv., 641, 802, 940; POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILIosPHY OF LAW,
c. 3. For Cardozo's views see THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, THE
GROWTH OF LAW;
PAPERS.

see also

HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW AND COLLECTED LEGAL
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keep pace with man, in order to develop in harmony with the subtle
nuances of his development, in order to adapt itself to the complexities of his constantly changing environment, would need to be a veritable chameleon. In reality it much more closely resembles the northern
star in its constancy and changelessness.
Aristotle recognized this fact of the insufficiency of law to provide
a solution for all cases.&2 He drew too the inevitable corollary of the
necessity of some element of man-made justice. But in doing so he did
not fail to point out the danger to be anticipated from the presence of
this human, variable element in administering the law, this "element of
the beast," as he so graphically describes it. He says "He who bids
the law rule may be deemed to bid God and reason alone rule, but he
who bids man rule adds an element of the beast; for desire is a wild
beast, and passion perverts the minds of rulers, even when they are the
best of men. The law is reason unaffected by desire." 3
The traditional statue of Justice, represents the goddess, blindfolded, holding a scale in one hand and a sword in the other. The
symbolism of this representation of Justice portrays the ideal which
men have set up for the administration of justice. They require of
justice that it shall be impartial, that it shall be no respecter of persons,
that it shall hold all men equal before the law. These requirements are
set forth eloquently and forcefully in the famous "Speech on the
Judicial Tenure" by Rufus Choate. He says of the judge :--"He shall
know nothing about the parties, everything about the case. He shall do
everything for justice; nothing for himself; nothing for his friend;
nothing for his patron; nothing for his sovereign. If on one side is
the executive power and the legislature and the people-the sources
of his honors, the givers of his daily bread, and on the other an individual nameless and odious, his eye is to see neither, great nor small;
attending only to the 'trepidations of the balance.' If a law is passed
by a unanimous legislature, clamored for by the general voice of the
public, and a cause is before him on it, in which the whole community
is on one side and an individual nameless and odious on the other, and
he believes it to be against the Constitution, he must so declare it--or
there be no judge. If Athens comes there to demand that the cup of
hemlock be put to the lips of the wisest of men; and he believes that
he has not corrupted the youth, nor omitted to worship the gods of the
city, nor introduced new deities of his own, he must deliver him,
although the thunder light on the unterrified brow."' Thus, the judge
2 As in other sciences, so in politics, it is impossible that all things should be set
down precisely; for enactments must be universal, but activities are"concerned
3 -with particulars. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS V, XIV; PoLITIcs II.
ARISTOTLE, PoLITIcs III, XVI.

4ADDRESSES AND ORATIONS OF RuFus CHOATE, (2d ed.) pp. 361-2. Just recently

an Athenian court reversed the sentence and condemnation of Socrates.
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in the exercise of the judicial function, is "the personification of justice."
The judicial power of the United States under the constitution is
vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress may
establish. The judicial power of the forty-eight states under the respective state constitutions is vested in a supreme court, and inferior courts
which are either specifically designated in the constitution or set up
according to provisions therein. These courts are commonly known as
constitutional courts, and their power is limited to judicial functions.
In reality though, there are two other classes of tribunals that exercise judicial power. The first are the so-called legislative courts. Under
the constitution of the United States, Congress is given the power,
among others, to (1) regulate commerce (2) appropriate money to
pay claims against the United States (3) make all needful rules and
regulations of government of the territories, and (4) exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the District of Columbia. Under these grants of
power, Congress created the Court of Custom Appeals, the Court of
Claims, the territorial courts, and to some extent the courts of the District of Columbia. The respective state legislatures, by power conferred
upon them by the state constitutions, establish courts of this same class
with limited jurisdiction. These legislative courts may be empowered
by statute to exercise a greater power than that given to constitutional
courts, in that they exercise functions which have been referred to as
quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative, and administrative.
The judicial function is vested in still another class of tribunals,
namely the administrative boards and commissions. These are sometimes referred to as "executive courts." They represent on the one
hand an effort to overcome the inevitable inefficiency inherent in a
government of divided powers, and on the other, an effort of government to adapt itself to the increasing complexity of social life. Another
reason assigned for their rapid spread is that "they have held promise
of expeditious, accurate, effective and inexpensive action. Their creation represented in part the public's revolt against a court system which
exalted contentiousness. The necessity for the establishment of some
of these agencies might have been obviated by our seasonably dredging of the existing channels of justice." 5 There is a tendency in certain
quarters to view with alarm what is considered the "usurpation" of
the judicial prerogative by these boards and commissions. However,
it is the opinion of experts that these administrative boards are with
us to stay and will not easily be stripped of their judicial powers7
5
Gambrell, The Improvement of Administrative Law, 23 A. B. A. J. 92.
6 Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 59th Annual Meet-

ing American Bar Association, Boston, 1936,
7

ADVAN CE PROGRAM

209 ff.

Pound, Social and Economic Problems of the Law (1928) 106 ANNALS 6;
Hyneman, Administrative Adjudication (1936) 51 PoL. Sci. Q. 383.
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The extent of this administrative adjudication becomes apparent, when
our attention is directed to the fact that in January, 1935, in the federal
government alone there were "73 federal administrative agencies,
exercising judicial power in 267 classes of cases, but-these totals
may be open to criticism for including doubtful or borderline cases
.. "-I The respective states, after 1900, established boards and commissions of this same class under state statutes, to aid in the multiplication of activities undertaken in state administrations. A list of administrative boards in most of the states would include eleven main
groups of interest and activities,* although no complete list has been
made.' 0
Any consideration of the administration of justice, necessarily,
brings up the question of tenure, because of the bearing it has on the
question of judicial independence. This is very forcefully expressed
in the words of Hamilton that "in the general course of human nature,
a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will."Tenure is either "during good behavior" or for a limited number of
years. It is impossible to consider the question of tenure without at
the same time considering the closely related problems of personnel
and method of selection. The question of personnel, while it applies
necessarily to the selection of judges, is of vital importance in a consideration of the allocation of judicial discretion to the members of
administrative boards and commissions. We cannot but agree with the
conclusion drawn by a recent writer on this subject, that "powers confidently entrusted to a department head in the national government
may seem strangely out of place in the hands of a village poundmaster." The possible methods of selection include appointment,
popular election, and some system based on merit, such as civil service.
An examination of the present status of tenure reveals a marked
divergence in practice on this point among the three classes of courts.
The federal judges of both constitutional and legislative courts hold
office "during good behavior." This is not true concerning the judges
who hold office in the constitutional and legislative courts in the respective states. The vast majority of the states follow the system of popular election of judges.'- The general practice in both the federal and
state governments in the selection of members for administrative
boards and commissions is to appoint them for a limited number of
years. The precarious status of these offices is described in the Report
8

Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 59th Annual Meeting

American Bar Association, Boston, 1936, ADVANCE PROGRAM 242-3.
00 OGG AND RAY, INTRODUcIION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2d ed.) 647.

' Hyneman, Administrative Adjudication (1936) 51 POL. Sc. Q. 385.
" THE FEDERALIST, No. LXXIX, (Lodge, 1923) 491.

= Hyneman, Administrative Adjudication (1936) 51 POL. SC. Q. 385.
ENCYCLOPEDIA or SocL SCIENCES: "Judiciary."
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of the Special Committee on Administrative Law of the American
Bar Association that "No member of an administrative tribunal enjoys
life tenure . . . The most that is enjoyed by an administrative agency

(other than elected officials) is a definite term of years in office, subject to removal by, the President for specified causes couched in such
vague language as 'inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in
office.' Most of the remaining agencies are in charge of persons having a status of day-to-day employees, more or less certain to lose their
4
positions with a change of political administration.'
We can, perhaps, obtain a clearer understanding of the issues involved in the question of tenure, by viewing it in its historical development. In early English practice, it was quite generally conceded,
that the decisions of the judges were dependent upon the pleasure of
the king. This was a natural outgrowth of the fact that judges held
their offices at the king's pleasure. Justice Berkeley in Hampden's
Case in 1637 boldly asserted that "The law is of itself an old and
trusty servant of the King's; it is his instrument or means which he
useth to govern his people by. I never heard or read that lex was Rex;
but it is common and most true that Rex is lex." Under the rule of
the Tudor and Stuart kings judges held their office at the pleasure of
the king, and bowed to the will of the king. The king consulted with
the judges beforehand, and anyone who showed the slightest independence was dismissed. King James I before the trial of the famous
Peacharn's Case in 1614 called in the judges for consultation. Sir
Edward Coke, the Chief Justice, staunchly opposed this action in taking the opinion of the judges beforehand, since it prejudiced them in
the hearing of the case and gave the King the chance to dictate what
their decision should be. In 1616 the matter came to a crisis. The
King removed Sir Edward Coke, when in the case brought against
the Bishop of Lichfield, Coke refused to obey the will of the King
saying that when a case came before him, he would act as became a
judge. "There is not in history a more terrible example of judges
perishing at the royal nod than this, nor a stronger evidence that the
power and prerogative of removing judges at pleasure were allowed to
be, by law, in the crown. It was loudly complained of as a grievance,
no doubt, and an arbitarary exertion of prerogative; but it was allowed
to be a legal prerogative still."' 5
In 1700 Parliament enacted the Act of Settlement, which was a
great step taken to protect the English people from the King, in that
into the commission of judges was written the principle that their
tenure should be made quamdiu se bene gesserit--"during good
'14ADVANCE PRoGRAm,
'-

American Bar Association, Boston, 1936, p. 227.

The Independence of the Judiciary, THE

Adams, ed.) 529.

WORKS OF JoHN ADAmS
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behavior," instead of at the pleasure of the King. This new doctrine
was not invoked for the purpose of making judges independent of
the people, but to make judges independent only to such a degree that
they would not yield to might as against right.
The Act of Settlement did not apply in the colonies. In fact, King
George III undertook to pay the salaries of the judges in the Massachusetts Bay colony, when a dispute arose between John Adams and
Gen. William Battle, a senior member of the Council, wherein John
Adams pointed out'6 that there was nothing in the commissions of the
colonial judges which could not prevent their removal by the Crown,
thus making the judges dependent upon the continued favor of the
Crown for the retention of their judgship. In fact one of the grievances cited in the Declaration of Independence was that the ing of
Great Britain had "made judges dependent on his will alone, for the
tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries."
It was therefore natural that all the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention in 1787, a majority of whom were lawyers, with the colonial experience with royal judges still fresh in their mind, agreed that
the judges should hold office during good behavior. 17 Hamilton referred
to this practice as "one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice of government." He said :-"According to the
plan of the Convention, all judges who may be appointed by the
United States are to hold their office during good behavior; which is
conformable to the most approved of the State constitutions, and
among the rest, to that of this State. Its propriety having been drawn
into question by the adversaries of that plan, is no light symptom of
the rage for objection, which disorders their imaginations and judgments. The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of
the judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the
modern improvements in the practice of government. In a monarchy
it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic
it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions
of the representative body." '
In the middle of the nineteenth century a movement for the election of judges swept over the United States. In the name of "democracy" it desired to subject the courts to popular control, although leaving them free from executive control. This new political philosophy
was based on the premises that the judge "should be elected as all
other public officials were, that there should be rotation in judicial
offices as in all others, that on the bench as elsewhere, in the public
-6 See footnote 15, supra.
I*JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (July 18,
18 THE FEDERAuST, No. LXXVIII, (Lodge, 1923)

1787) 377.
483.
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service 'to the victor belongs the spoils,' and that incredible as it may
seem, too great a knowledge of the law might be a judicial handicap."1
Many of the states changed at this time from the appointive to
the elective system and from life tenure to a period of years-anywhere from two year terms as in Vermont to a twenty-one year term
in Pennsylvania. Agitation was prevalent to extend this "reform" even
to the federal judiciary as is seen from the message of President
Johnson to Congress July 18, 1868, recommending a constitutional
amendment by which the terms of judicial officers would be limited to
a number of years. He says :-"It is strongly impressed on my mind
that the tenure of office by the judiciary of the United States during
good behavior for life is incompatible with the spirit of republican
government, and in this opinion I am fully sustained by the evidence of
popular judgment upon this subject in the different States of the
Union. I therefore deem it my duty to recommend an amendment to
the Constitution by which the terms of the judicial officers would be
limited to a period of years." ° The change which President Johnson
advocated did not come to pass. For the people never saw fit to apply
to the federal judiciary the principle of popular election, despite the
fact that one after another of the states, as we have seen, fell in line
with this "democratic" movement.
Up to this point we have been concerned in our discussion with
a general statement of the problems involved in the question of tenure
and its bearing on the administration of justice. We have shown what
is implied in the phrase, "administration of justice," its relation to law,
and the function of those charged with the duty of administering it.
We have designated those who are included among "judicial and
administrative officers." We have discussed tenure with the related
problems of personnel and method of selection. We have shown the
present status as regards tenure of all charged with the administration of justice in the United States. We have touched on the history
of the question of tenure. With this background of necessary information, we can now proceed to discuss the effects of the insecurity of
tenure on the administration of justice.
It is always a difficult matter to isolate a particular cause, and assign
to it a particular effect. Most effects are too complex and the result of
too many contributing causes, to admit of the simplication of such
treatment. This is especially true of a thing, such as the administration
of justice, which is the result of the interplay of so many different
forces. Any attempt to analyze the causes contributing to inefficiency
-9Vanderbilt, Past Present and Future of the Legal Profession (1936)
AmEP. Ju. Soc. 211.
20
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PREsnDENTs 643.

20 J.
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in the administration of justice would necessarily include a great number of influences.- There is, however, a value in the attempt to isolate
an individual cause, such as insecurity of tenure, and determine its
effect, when we do it realizing the limitations that necessarily attach
to any such effort. It is with this reservation, that we proceed with the
attempt to determine in what ways the individual factor of insecurity
of tenure is reflected in the administration of justice.
The case for insecurity of tenure is usually based on the following
considerations. It is argued that it is more democratic. It was under theaegis of democracy, as we have seen, that the majority of the states
changed from the appointive system with its tenure "during good
behavior," to the elective system with tenure restricted to a limited
number of years. Another argument usually advanced is that judicial
officers, who hold their office for a limited tenure, and are subject to
reelection and reappointment, are in closer touch with the people, and
less likely to balk popular legislation by their decisions. A third argument is that it eliminates the danger of a judge becoming autocratic,
high-handed and overbearing in the conduct of his office, which results,
it is claimed, frequently flow from the provision of tenure "during
good behavior."
While there is an element of truth in the above contentions, it
would appear, at least in the case of the first two, that they proceed
from a misconception of the nature of the function of the judiciary,
and in particular, a misconception of the somewhat peculiar position
of a judiciary in a government like that of the United States, which is
established under a strict constitution. To say that the elective system
is more democratic seems to imply that the judiciary is to be subservient to the will of the people. In reference to the second argument,
the very purpose for the existence of judicial review of the constitutionality of acts of the legislature would be nullified, if it was intended
that the judiciary would reflect the transitory desires of the majority.
As to the last, even supposing that an individual judge should be
unfaithful to his trust, that is no argument for changing any system
of tenure, but rather should result in providing that system with an
efficient and effective method of recall.
There is great dissatisfaction with the actual effects of insecurity
of tenure, if we can judge from what authorities have to say about it.
The growing demand for judicial reforms in the states led to the
formation of the American Judicature Society in 1913. This organization advocates a simplication of legal procedure, longer tenure, better
21

For a discussion of some of the factors that enter into the problem see
Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice (1937) 21 J. AmE_ Jui. Soc. 178-187.
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salaries for judges, and some method of selection more satisfactory
than popular election has proved to be. The Cleveland Bar Association
learned, after several years of strenuous campaigning for candidates
approved by the Association, that the elective system was fundamentally defective. Professor Charles T. McCormick in an article entitled
More Light on JudicialSelection, in commenting upon the conditions
existing in Chicago declared that "the collapse of the theory of selection of judges by the people is complete."2
Before we turn to the consideration of the actual effects of insecurity of tenure, it is necessary to make a distinction in our treatment of
the question between those who exercise the judicial function alone,
and those who in addition to the judicial function, have quasi-legislative, and quasi-administrative powers. Some effects of the insecurity of
tenure are common both to regular judges and to the members of
administrative boards exercising judicial powers. Others, however, are
peculiar to the members of the administrative boards. We shall consider first such effects as are common to both.
In our consideration of the ideal in the administration of justice,
the requirement of impartiality stands out above all others. This, it
would seem, is a sine qua non, an indispensable factor, in the exercise of judicial power. This impartiality in turn demands independence
on the part of the judge. Without security of tenure there can be no
independence. Even a superficial knowledge of the facts of human
psychology, would lead inevitably to this conclusion. Human beings are
so constituted that whether they will it or not motives of self interest
enter into and color their thinking. "The wish is father to the thought"
is not only a clever expression, but a deep truth of human psychology.
It has led the noted psychologist, William James, to conclude that
truth is ultimately nothing but what a man wills to believe. But while
William Jame's Faith Ladder may satisfy the demands of a not
too exacting pragmatic philosophy, it would be a poor substitute for
the more objective type of truth, which we like to think of as forming
the basis of judicial decisions. Insecurity of tenure places too many
obstacles in the way of the judge in his efforts to arrive at the unbiased,
impartial decision.
If we want to know how tenure of office operates to have a judge
dependent on the power to appoint him-dependent for his continuance
in that office or for his restoration to it-in short, dependent on everything, we need but refer to England prior to the Act of Settlement.
The judge was merely the tool of the royal hand that made and unmade
him. Since the enactment of the Act of Settlement, England has
appointed its judges "for good behavior," and by reason of its civil
= McCormick, More Light on JudicialSelection (1936) 20 J. Am.R.

JUD.

Soc. 41.
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service has made "career men" out of its administrative officers. We,
in America, under the cloak of democracy, claim to know the manthe judicial man-better than did the illustrious framers of the federal
constitution. Instead of appointment "during good behavior," in all
but a few instances, we appoint him for a period of years, or have him
run for the office, under an elective system. The inevitable result of
this insecurity of tenure flows necessarily from the very nature of man,
in that he will administer justice, tempered by the desire or need for
reelection or reappointment.
The second effect to be attributed to insecurity of tenure, is that it
places a premium upon ignorance and incompetence in offices where
these defects can least be tolerated. It makes it practically impossible
to attract men having the qualities most necessary for these offices.
There is no incentive for an able lawyer to give up his practice, which
he has built up laboriously over a number of year, for a judgeship or
administrative office for a period of a few years. He has reason to
fear that at the end of his term, he will not be reelected or reappointed,
and he will come down from the bench, an older man, with no source
of income since his practice has disappeared in the meantime. To an
even greater degree insecurity of tenure operates to staff administrative boards with poorly qualified officials, because there is no prerequisite of education or training, such as is required of judges. The situation is graphically set forth by President Dodds of Princeton in a
recent article--"Except for posts in which technical qualifications are
obviously indispensable, we adhere even today pretty closely to the
Jacksonian doctrine, paraphrased by John Stuart Mill, that any man
not fit to be hanged is fit for any office he can get."2 Appointments
are usually made for political purposes, or on the basis of personal
friendship, family relationship, or religious affiliations; in short for
any reason other than the one important reason of ability and qualifications requisite for the position. As a result, all too often, judicial offices
are filled by incompetent and untrained men, who look upon a public
office as a reward for party loyalty or as a means of enhancing their
personal prestige, rather than as an opportunity for public service.
The third effect of insecurity of tenure is that it places our judicial
and administrative offices right in politics, where success or failure will
be determined in the white heat of partisanship upon one's ability of getting or controlling votes. 4 An individual who is not scrupulous about
using any means to attain his office, cannot be expected to be over
scrupulous in his conduct of the office, when he has attained it. Hence
it is that insecurity of tenure very frequently breeds corruption in
23Dodds, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (1937) 189 ANNALs 167.
u See Haggerty, Spoils and the Racket (1937) 189 ANNALs 18.
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office. This is, to be sure, the darkest side of the picture, but even at
its best, the system is replete with danger for the administration of
justice. "The judge who wants to keep his place must think of political
consequences. He must shirk responsibility and hide behind the jury
whenever he can. He must dodge every issue which might 'make somebody mad,' and, whenever he has to decide such an issue, put an ear
to the ground and let the political forces decide for him. Indeed, the
elective system does not tend to eliminate the unfit judge-its tendency
is to eliminate the poor politician. Politics is a game, and those who
play at it best are not the judges who are attending to business, but
those who slap backs and know how to bend with the wind.":25 Administrative boards are subject to an even greater degree to the subversive influence of politics. They are considered a legitimate field for
the exercise of patronage. Only a very small percentage of the positions are subject to civil service requirements. Moreover, the very
fact of the closeness of these boards to the people, entails a greater
danger of favoritism and the granting of special privilege.
Thus out of this practice of insecurity of tenure there results a
three-fold evil effect, dependency, ignorance and corruption in the
ministers of justice. We cannot help but recall the apt words of Chief
justice Marshall on these evils. He said "I have always thought, from
my earliest youth till now, that the greatest scourge an angry Heaven
ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and sinning people, was an ignorant,
a corrupt or a dependent judiciary."' 2 6
In addition to the evil effects enumerated above, administrative
boards present a somewhat specialized problem of their own. The
problem arises from the very point which makes for the efficiency of
these boards, namely the fusion in a single office of the three functions
of government-executive, legislative and judicial. The danger, which
Montesquieu feared from such a uniting of powers, has not ceased
to be a threat. He states :-" 'When the legislative and executive powers
are united in the same person or body, there can be no liberty, because
apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact
tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner.' Again 'Were
the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of
the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control for the judge would
be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge
might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.' ,,27
A consideration of the evil effects of insecurity of tenure would
be incomplete without some suggestions of means to eliminate them.
One fact that would seem to be established beyond doubt, in the above
25

Shartel, Retirement and Removal of Judges (1936) 20 J.

AMER. JUD.

Soc. 150.

26Riley v. Carter, 165 Okla. 262, 25 P. (2d) 666, 88 A.L.R. 1018, 1025 (1933).
27 TH

FEDERAuST,

No. XLVII (Lodge, 1923) 302-3.
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analysis, is the inadequacy of both of the prevailing systems of selection of judicial and administrative officers. The elective system, of.
course, falls with insecurity of tenure, for insecurity is inherent in
the system of popular election. Of the appointive system, as practiced
at the present time, it may be said that where it implies a term for a
limited time, the same argument applies. Where appointment is made
to last "during- good behavior" it amounts to tenure for life, since
impeachment has proved practically worthless as a means of ridding
the bench of incompetent and unworthy judges.
In any system for the administration of justice, which the mind of
man has or can conceive, there will always come to the surface the
frailty of human nature, as personified by the individual jurist. We all
seek after that system which gives us the highest degree of assurance
that "taking man as he is, at his stroqgest and at his weakest, and in
the average of the lot of humanity," it will give us the best judge on
every bench of justice. Since the end of any system is to achieve an
almost God-like ideal of justice, and the instrumentalities for the
attainment of that end are fallible, human beings endowed with an
intellect and free will, as well as all the weaknesses of our human
nature, temptation, or an opportunity of effecting a miscarriage of
justice, must be removed, as far away as humanly possible, from the
judges.
There is in each of us a motivating power or tendency, whether
we call it a philosophy of life or not, which gives coherence and direction to thought and action. Throughout our entire life forces, which
we do not recognize and cannot name, have colored our outlook on
life and our conception of social needs. The philosopher, Roger Bacon,
said-"There are four chief obstacles in grasping truth, which hinder
every man, however learned,-namely, submission to faulty and unworthy authority, influence of custom, popular prejudice, and concealment of our own ignorance accompanied by an ostentatious display of
our knowledge."' s Every man is entangled in these difficulties-judges
being no exception.
It is next to impossible to formulate a plan which would meet the
needs of both the judicial and administrative officers. It therefore
becomes necessary to sketch a plan for each. The proposed plans will
not be complete in themselves, but rather be pliable enough to meet
The Opus MAjus of Roger Bacon-Translated by Robert Belle Burke, part I,
c. 1, p. 4. Francis Bacon in his ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNNIG and in his NovuM
ORGANUM states that the deepest fallacies of the mind are idols. These fallacies
are imposed upon the understanding by (1) Idols of the Tribe-the general
nature of man; (2) Idols of the Den-the nature of each particular man;
(3) Idols of the Market-word, or communicative nature; (4) Idols of the
Theatre-false theories or philosophies. Of the four, the last is the easiest to
set aside, while the others seize the mind strongly and cannot be eradicated.
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conditions in an ever-changing society. As a preface to any plan, we
state that we are not at present concerned with its constitutionality.
If the same cannot be attained without constitutional amendment,
then the evils which we propose to eliminate make it imperative for
all liberty loving people to exert their best efforts to effect this end.
We do not under any circumstances, hold out that these plans are selfconceived, but rather that they represent the thought and effort of
many able lawyers. We have borrowed freely from their proposals0 9
and experience, hoping thereby to aid in the elimination of the present
evils resulting from insecurity of tenure under the elective and appointive system.
At the time of the drafting of the federal constitution, the same
question arose as to whether the judges should be appointed or elected.
Benjamin Franklin then told the delegates what he understood was
the practice in Scotland. The lawyers themselves nominated the judge
and they always selected the ablest of the profession "in order to get
rid of him and share his practice among themselves. ' ' 0
Any consideration of a plan guaranteeing security of tenure, also
calls for a consideration of its corrolaries, namely method of selection
and supervision of the judges. It is only through security of tenure
that the independence of the judiciary can be achieved. Tenure should
be made so certain as to attract competent and qualified men thereby
once again making "the satisfaction of public effort greater than those
of private gain." 3' Tenure does not only mean a remuneration sufficiently large to permit the judge to save something for his old age,
but also a provision for removal or retirement with a limited pension
when the judge becomes unfit to hold judicial office.
The administration of justice must be taken out of politics. The
power to select men for judicial office cannot be vested in the executive, but with the chief justice. The executive will designate one of
the associate justices of the supreme court as chief justice, who will
preside for a period of time equivalent to a single term of the executive. Upon completion of his term the chief justice reverts to the rank
of an associate justice, never again to have the honor, dignity and
responsibility of chief justice. The chief justice can obtain the guidance
of an advisory council composed of lawyers, executives, labor representatives and other classes, as to whom he should appoint. The responsibility for the appointment shall rest squarely upon the chief justice.
This is in keeping with the proposal made by Alexander Hamilton,
2
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when he said-"I proceed to lay it down as a rule, that one man of
discernment is better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, than a body of men of equal or perhaps even of superior discernment. The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a
more exact regard to reputation. He will, on this account, feel himself
under highest obligations, and more interested to investigate with care
the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled, and to prefer with
impartiality the persons who may have the fairest pretensions to
them."' The appointment shall be of a person under forty-five years
of age and for a probationary period of three years, at which time
the judge runs "on his record," no one opposing him when he accounts
to the people for his stewardship. If the people approve he is then
returned to the bench for another period of five years, when for a
second time he runs "on his record." He, then, remains on the bench
for another twelve years-or a total of twenty years-before he is
retired. His tenure should not be for life, since the older the judge
becomes, the harder it is for him to change his views with the change
in social conditions, thereby making it impossible for him to interpret
the law in the light of the needs of the generaton. If he should become
disabled, incompetent or neglectful of his duties, he could be removed
upon a proper hearing had and a verdict of "guilty" returned. Upon
being retired the judge would not return to the general law practice,
but would receive a pension of approximately one-half of his salary.
Proper supervision of the judiciary, by the supreme and circuit
court judges, would really result in tenure being for good behavior.
If any judge should become arbitrary and high handed he could be
"toned down," by being under supervision. If the facts should justify
removal, the chief justice would have the authority to remove. Supervision should check most bad practices at an early stage, and almost
eliminate the need for removal.
This then, in brief is our plan for eliminating the three evils existing in the judicial system by reason of insecurity of tenure, namely
dependence, ignorance and corruption among the judges.
In reference to the proposed plan for security of tenure for administrative boards, the members thereof cannot be divorced entirely from
politics. Positions concerned with policy-forming activities should be
subject to party control, since policy formation is primarily a function of the political or elected officials of government. Administration
is, or should be, a non-political function concerned with the direction,
improvement and operation of the business of government. All the
members of boards which perform non-political functions, should be
= THE FEDERALIST, No. LXXVI (Lodge, 1923) 472.
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placed under civil service. This administrative service should be open
primarily to college graduates, who accept the appointment as a career,
especially with opportunities open to them to advance themselves.
Luther Steward in a recent article on The Public Servant stated that
an employee's will to serve "must be matched by opportunities for him
to do so without political interference, without constant harassments
due to uncertainty of tenure and without a haunting fear of the future.
It must be matched by a system under which his loyalty and efficiency
will be recognized and rewarded, surely and systematically, and by one
which will attract and hold talent which is the equal of any the country
affords."a3
In addition to putting non-political board members under civil
service, our plan also includes the establishment of an administrative
court to effect independent review of the decisions of the many administrative boards. This would restore the constitutional guarantees to
individuals, who otherwise are "defenseless against injustice at the
hands of arbitrary, capricious or corrupt public officials." Z
Some such reform as we have outlined above with its proviso of
security of tenure would seem to be an indispensable feature of a
judicial system whose aim is justice-justice, not merely "according
to law," but justice in its fuller and more complete significance, in
which it is synonymous with the common good. The plan proposed
cannot remove all the causes of dissatisfaction with the administration of justice but it will at least bring us a trifle closer to a realization
of the "kingdom of justice on earth."

z Steward, The Public Servant (1937) 189 ANNALS 67.
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